It has been identified that the pressure in the reactor coolant system (RCS) remains high in some severe accident sequences at the time of reactor vessel failure, with the risk of causing direct containment heating (DCH). Intentional depressurization is an effective accident management strategy to prevent DCH or to mitigate its effects. Fission product behavior is affected by intentional depressurization, especially for inert gas and volatile fission product. Because the pressurizer power-operated relief valves (PORVs) are latched open, fission product will transport into the containment directly. This may cause larger radiological consequences in containment before reactor vessel failure. Four cases are selected, including the TMLB' base case and opening one, two and three pressurizer PORVs. The results show that inert gas transports into containment more quickly when opening one and two PORVs, but more slowly when opening three PORVs; more volatile fission product deposit in containment and less in reactor coolant system (RCS) for intentional depressurization cases. When opening one PORV, the phenomena of revaporization is strong in the RCS .
INTRODUCTION
During many severe accidents in PWR NPPs, the reactor core may melt down at high pressure [1] . Molten corium might eject and disperse from the lower head break into containment atmosphere, potentially causing DCH. The potential hydrogen deflagration or detonation and thermal shock could threaten the containment integrity. Releases as a result of pressure driven expulsion of fission product are usually found to be risk significant if they coincide with containment failure. In this condition, fission product can contribute to large dose rates. Intentional depressurization which assumes the PORVs are latched open when the core exit thermocouple temperature reaches ~922 K is used to prevent DCH [2] . Depressurization of the reactor coolant system can have other consequences such as enhanced fission product release from the fuel and transport through the reactor coolant system and, perhaps, accelerated core degradation because of the loss more coolant through the PORVs. Due to opening PORVs and low pressure during core melt, fission product behavior may be greatly different, especially for inert gas and volatile fission product.
Mitigation and even elimination of the release of fission product by pressure-driven expulsion of melt from the reactor vessel can be achieved by reducing the pressure difference between the reactor vessel and the reactor containment [3] . After PORVs are latched open, there is a long duration release of fission product to the containment atmosphere. There are some important effects on fission product phenomenon including aerosol sedimentation, aerosol inertial impaction, aerosol thermophoresis, revaporation, and so on. It is identified that the distribution of fission products in the primary system and in containment changes. The radioactivity in containment may be changed, impacting severe accident management.
A typical high pressure core melt sequence, TMLB' station blackout scenario, is chosen as the base case of depressurization analysis herein. The accident is assumed to be initiated by the loss of offsite and onsite AC&DC power with no recovery of steam generator auxiliary feedwater. The fission product behavior including inert gas and volatile fission product is evaluated using the severe accident analysis code to determine the effect of depressurization on fission product behavior.
PLANT MODEL
For a Chinese 3-loop PWR nuclear power plant with 900MWe, the severe-accident code is used to analyze the effect of intentional depressurization on fission product behavior. The reactor coolant system is modeled with a reactor vessel, active core region and two reactor coolant loops -the broken and unbroken loops, as illustrated in Fig.1 . The broken loop models a single hot leg, steam generator, intermediate leg, reactor coolant pump and cold leg. Additionally, the pressurizer is located on the broken loop hot leg. The unbroken loop combines the remaining two reactor coolant loops and steam generators. The pressurizer PORVs comprise of three groups of individual relief valves which could operate automatically around their opening set pressure or be latched open by the operator. The fission product passing through the relief valves can transport to the quench tank, and directly into the containment after the quench tank rupture disk fails.
Fig.1 RCS and Pressurizer PORVs model

FISSION PRODUCTS GROUPS AND INITIAL MASS COMPUTATION
All the fission product is divided into 12 groups, as shown in Table 1 , which includes inert gas (group 1), volatile fission product (group 2, 3, 6, 10 and 11) and nonvolatile fission product (the other groups), each group having common physical and chemical characteristics. Initial fission product mass computation is based on the hypothesis that all the fuels are divided into 3 kinds, that which has been radiated for 1, 2 and 3 years, respectively. 
ANALYSIS OF FISSION PRODUCT BEHAVIOR
Accident Progression Analysis
Four cases are selected, including the TMLB' base case and three depressurization cases. In the first depressurization case, only one PORV could be latched open by the operator when the core exit temperature exceeds 922K. In the second depressurization case, the operator latched open two PORVs. The third case indicates that all the three PORVs could be latched open during intentional depressurization. The time of core melt and RPV low head failure is decided by two reasons, which includes the number of PORV are latched open and the time of accumulator injection. The analysis is focused on the effect of intentional depressurization on fission product behavior, especially for inert gas and volatile fission product, and how different depressurization cases impact fission product release, transport and distribution.
The key events of the four accident sequences evaluated are shown in Table 2 . 
Inert Gas Analysis
For the base case, as shown in Fig.2 . With increasing RCS pressure, PORV setpoint pressure is reached, and the PORV cycles open/closed to maintain the RCS pressure around 16.37Mpa, the rupture disk of quench tank is failed at 6,430s. After core is uncovered, gap release starts at 9,434s, inert gas releases from the core and accumulates in the RCS, part of the inert gas transports to the quench tank through the PORV cycle open/closed, then the inert gas which exists in the quench tank directly transports into containment. The residual inert gas in the RCS transports into containment after the reactor pressure vessel (PRV) lower head fails. As shown in Fig.3 , there are three quick releases into containment for inert gas. The first quick release occurs when the core begins to melt, 132kg inert gas transports into containment through failed rupture disk within 1000s. The second quick release occurs at the time of the core support plate failure, a great deal of molten core materials drains into the lower head and interacts with coolant, which makes RCS pressure increase immediately and the frequency of PORV opening increases, so about 42kg inert gas transports directly into containment through the PORV within 300s. The last quick release is at the time of RPV lower head failure, about 92kg inert gas transports into containment through the RPV lower head at once. When computation ends (Table. 2), there are 297.3kg inert gas transported into containment and only 1.7kg inert gas retained in the RCS, approximately 31 percent of inert gas transports into containment through the RPV lower head.
For the depressurization cases, there is the same accident progression as the base case before the PORVs are latched open. PORVs setpoint pressure is reached at 3,871s and the rupture disk is failed at 6,430s. When the core exit thermocouple exceeds 922 K (~9,205s ), PORVs are latched open by the operator. Due to the loss of more coolant through the PORVs and accumulators injection is not sufficient when opening one or two PORVs, the time of core melt and inert gas releases is earlier than the base case, as illustrated in Table 2 and Fig.2 . In the case of opening three PORVs, RCS pressure decreases quickly and accumulators inject coolant earlier, so the progression of core melt is very slow. Unlike the base case, inert gas in depressurization cases does not accumulate in the RCS for a long time. With the opening of the PORVs by operator, inert gas releases from the core and transports into containment through the PORVs. The more pressurizer PORVs that are latched open, the less inert gas that retains in RCS before RPV fails. Especially for the case of opening three PORVs, after 22,000s, a large amount of inert gas begins to release from the core and transports into containment quickly, very little is retained in the RCS during the accident. It can be seen that almost 99 percent of inert gas for depressurization cases transports directly into containment through the PORVs. According to the above analysis, the effect of depressurization on inert gas behavior can be seen. The first effect is that less inert gas retained in RCS for depressurization cases, and the more pressurizer PORVs that are latched open, the less inert gas that is retained in RCS before the RPV fails. Another effect is the different fraction of inert gas that transports through the PORVs, which is respectively 99 percent and 59 percent for depressurization cases and base case.
Volatile Fisssion Products Analysis
There are similar physical and chemical characteristics for all volatile fission product groups, therefore group 2 was chosen to analyze volatile fission product behavior. Group 2 is consisted of CsI and RbI, which is the main form of iodine during accident [4] . There are there states for volatile fission product, which respectively are vapor, aerosol and deposition.
For the base case, CsI&RbI are released from core during core melt. Most of CsI&RbI deposits on surfaces of the RCS heat sink, only little suspended CsI&RbI is in the form of vapor and aerosol (Fig 4, 5, 6 ). With the PORV cycling open/closed, suspended CsI&RbI transports through the PORV, then moves into containment (Fig 8&9) . Because of low temperature and pressure, suspended CsI&RbI deposits gradually on walls, floors and other heat sinks in containment (Fig 7) . There is sedimentation, thermophoresis and inertial impaction for aerosol in this process. The RCS pressure stays high during accident, so the deposition mass in the RCS is larger than in containment. When computation ends (Table. 2), 26.3kg CsI&RbI is released from the core. Among of the released CsI&RbI, 24kg is retained in the RCS, almost all in the form of deposition. 2.3kg of released CsI&RbI exists in containment, only 0.28kg CsI&RbI suspends in containment, others also deposits in containment.
In the case of one PORV latched open, the PORV is opened at 9,200s, with greater coolant loss through the PORV, the core begins to melt earlier than in the base case, but at 11,447s, accumulators are initiated, which slows core melt progression. Most of the released CsI&RbI still deposits on the surface of the RCS heat sink, other aerosol and vapor transports directly into containment through PORV, then deposits gradually in containment. With the decreasing RCS pressure, revaporization occurs for deposited CsI&RbI in the RCS (Fig 4, 8, 9 ), much CsI&RbI vapor is generated from deposition and tranports into containment through the PORV, finally deposits in containment. When computation is ended, 26.5kg CsI&RbI is released from the core, only 3.9kg CsI&RbI is retained in the RCS, which almost all is in the form of deposition. There is 3.2kg CsI&RbI suspending in containment, others also deposits in containment.
In the case of two PORVs latched open, accumulators are initiated at 10366s. During core melting, part of the released CsI&RbI deposits gradually in the RCS, others transports into containment, then deposits in the containment. Unlike opening one PORV, the phenomenon of revaporization is not strong. Lastly, 26.7kg CsI&RbI is released from the core, only 8kg CsI&RbI is retained in the RCS. There are respectively 0.68kg and 2.31kg CsI&RbI suspending in the RCS and containment.
In the case of three PORVs latched open, RCS pressure is low in the early time, so there isn't revaporization. The CsI&RbI retained in RCS is the least. Lastly, 26.7kg CsI&RbI is released, only 1.5kg is in the RCS. There are respectively 0.06kg and 0.78kg CsI&RbI suspending in the RCS and containment.
According to the above analysis, it can be seen the effect of depressurization on volatile fission product behavior. In the depressurization cases, because of low RCS pressure during the accident, less volatile fission product deposits in the RCS and more volatile fission product deposits in containment, and there is the least deposition for the case of two PORVs. When opening one PORV, the phenomena of revaporization is strong in the RCS. 
